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ABSTRACT:
This paper studies the possible effects of liquidity providers, i.e. market makers on a 
company’s stock at the Helsinki Stock exchange, which is rather new service available only 
since 2004 at the exchange. Liquidity providing is marketed as a tool for a company to 
improve its stocks liquidity and the main objective of this study has been to discover whether 
market making actually works. The effects in liquidity have been viewed using the bid-ask 
spread, bid-ask spread volatility and turnover as proxies for liquidity. Also the effects on 
stock price and possible abnormal returns have been taken into consideration.
The results obtained supported the function of the market maker. The average intraday spread 
fell from 1.49% to 1.15% during the measuring period. In relation with the decrease, the 
intraday spread volatility also decreased, implying that the presence of a market maker would 
have a stabilizing effect. Using trading volumes and zero-volume trading days as proxies for 
liquidity, it was found that market making had an improving effect. Both proxies experienced 
an increase after the commencement of market making.
However, two other measures would imply that although liquidity was improved, the stocks 
were still rather illiquid. Firstly, the commencement of market making did not produce any 
abnormal returns for the stocks. Although the stock prices rose, the performance was in line 
with that of the market. Secondly, the price volatility did not experience any changes after the 
market making begun. If the stocks would have gained enough in liquidity, the amount of 
informed trading should have decreased in relation to the amount of liquidity trading, 
lowering the volatility. This however was not visible, implying that although liquidity 
proving succeeded in its function, more measures are needed to insure overall liquidity.
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1.1 Background and purpose
Market making is an active function in many international stock exchanges. It is where a 
company provides bid ask quotes for stocks, acting as an intermediate. The market maker is 
not a “long term” investor, but tries to manage inventories, with the purpose of providing a 
bid and an ask for a security so that investors acting on the market are able to purchase or sell 
the stock independent of other traders on the market.
OMX also has active market makers functioning on the markets. However, organized market 
making for stocks at the Helsinki Stock Exchange is relatively new service offered to listed 
companies. Before year 2004 only few companies on the I-list used the service and there were 
no criteria set for the market maker. With a model from (then) the Swedish stock exchange, 
Helsinki Stock Exchange introduced LP - liquidity-providing service in April 2004, where a 
broker/dealer acts as a market maker for company’s share. Before this market making had 
been common only for Finnish derivatives.
Helsinki Stock Exchange has drafted an agreement for parties to use and also set minimum 
requirements for the market making. Each market maker is obligated to quote bid and asks 
worth of 4000 eur with a minimum spread of 4% calculated from the bid price. In most cases 
the agreed quoting is larger and spread narrower. There are currently 34 securities with 
Liquidity Provider- agreement trading on the Helsinki exchange. These companies have 
entered into an agreement with a brokerage company acting as a market maker. Companies 
pay the market maker to provide markets with an agreed bid-ask spread, each quote 
containing the agreed number of shares.
Helsinki Stock Exchange was rather small exchange before it was integrated as a part of the 
Nordic OMX exchange. Currently there are 128 different stocks listed under the OMX 
Helsinki list, with 120 different companies. Some companies have thus 2 different series 
listed on the exchange dividing the trading volumes even more. In most cases however, the
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other of the shares is highly illiquid with more voting power and extremely low free float. 
Stock trading volumes at the Helsinki stock exchange were 144 708 mil. eur, 181 161 mil. 
eur, 224 960. million eur. and 231 571 million during years 2003-2006 respectively. The total 
trading volume of the five most traded stocks amounted up to 126 094 million Euro year 
2003, 149 575 million Euro year 2004, 162 480 million Euro year 2005 and 201 478 million 
Euro in year 2006. These figures show that the 5 most traded shares totaled 87%, 83%, 72% 
and 86% of the total annual yearly trading volumes respectively. As the figures clearly 
indicate, the trading volumes of the remaining 115 shares are low, creating a number of highly 
illiquid shares of the remaining 118 shares are low, creating a number of highly illiquid 
shares.
This study will discuss liquidity and the different measures for it. Also the advantages of 
having sufficient liquidity are closely observed. In addition to liquidity, this study will also 
discuss the role of market makers and specialists in providing liquidity to the market.
Since the shares trading under the Helsinki list are rather illiquid and market making is 
relatively new at the Helsinki Stock Exchange the main objective of this study is to determine 
whether signing a market making agreement really has an effect on the liquidity of a security 
of a company. The evidence is based on previous international studies and empirical research 
done on the securities with market making agreements.
1.2 Contribution
Market making has been studied internationally since already over 10 years. In addition 
market making on derivatives has also been looked at. However, since market making for 
stocks traded at the Helsinki Stock Exchange is relatively new, only relative few, if any, 
studies have been conducted. One of the latest studies made on the OMX is the study by 
Perttu Te vanen (2007) who wrote his thesis on the impact of liquidity providers. However, he 
studied the effect using closing spreads and prices on daily levels. This study will contribute 
to his findings by using intraday spreads and spread volatilities, thus observing more closely
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the market makers function. In addition to Mr. Tevanen's study on price reaction, this study 
will contribute by measuring for abnormal returns and return volatility.
Helsinki Stock Exchange itself has also conducted minor studies on whether market making 
has an effect on the liquidity of the stock mainly by looking at the turnover of the stock one 
month before and after market making agreement. The study measured the spread, number of 
trades. Euro amount of trades and total turnover.
The purpose of this study is thus to analyze the arguments for market making at OMX and to 
see what, if any, affect it has on the stock and its behavior. We will compare the intraday bid- 
ask spread and its volatility on the stocks before and after market making has commenced. 
We will also look at possible changes in the risk premium investors require for holding an 
illiquid asset by not just looking for stock price increases, but also abnormal return. In 
addition, finally to study the changes in liquidity we will also use trading volumes and zero- 
volume trading days as proxy for measuring the effect of market makers.
1.3 Limitations of the study
It would be beneficial to study the trading activity of the market maker on the trades, but that 
will not be looked at, since no such data is available currently. The trading data would only 
indicate the broker / dealer behind the trade, but no knowledge of who (customer, prop­
trading, market maker or internet trader) was behind the trade could not be ascertained.
Perhaps the biggest handicap is that the depth of the market is not studied. This however is 
currently not possible as no such data is available.
Also, most literature proving the effectiveness of a market maker in providing liquidity is 
based on large exchanges such as NYSE, NASDAQ, and LSE or on the OTC market. In all of 
the studies and liquidity measurements there is more than one market maker for each security. 
At the HSE however there is only one market maker for each security. Therefore the literature
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obtained from those studies and the evidence for the effectiveness of market making on the 
liquidity of the stock might not be fully applicable to the Finnish market as such.
As stated before, there are currently 34 companies which have signed a market making 
agreement with a brokerage company. Since most of the companies are extremely illiquid, 
finding enough data proved challenging. 11 of the companies have signed market making 
contract rather recently, so they were exclude due to the lack of historical data. In addition, 
out of rest 25 companies only 14 had enough data to view the effects of market making on 
intraday bid-ask spread. Is the sample enough to get accurate evidence? Some might argue 
that no, it is not. However, since there is not much more intraday data available, it is the best 
alternative when looking at market making in Finland.
1.4 Structure of the study
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses liquidity and how it 
can be defined. It also deals with common measures for liquidity and if any, which advantages 
liquidity brings for a security, more specifically for a stock. Section 3 focuses on market 
making as a function and determines whether or not it offers any advantages on national level. 
Also motivations for market makers and companies are discussed. Section 4 states the 
hypothesis for the empirical study. Section 5 presents a detailed description of the data and 
methods applied in the study. Section 6 presents the empirical evidence and discusses the 
results, with section 7 concluding the study.
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2 LIQUIDITY
In order to discuss the role of market makers and their role in providing liquidity, we should 
first examine what is meant by liquidity, the role of liquidity in asset pricing and volatility as 
well as the “correct” way of measuring it. In this section of the study also the proxies used to 
measure liquidity are discussed.
“Liquidity is the grease that facilitates the smooth functioning of financial markets. A lack of 
liquidity is a form of frictions that can have adverse effects on asset values” (Chordia et al 
2004). Chordia et al made a very appropriate description of liquidity. However putting it like 
that makes the definition of liquidity very vague. It should be remembered that different 
markets have different levels of liquidity. For example, an OTC market, where assets are 
traded between two parties with privately negotiated transactions, is more illiquid than an 
organized stock exchange where there is the possibility of multiple buyers and sellers, 
offering different prices. We will not go into detail comparing different markets or assets 
classes and their liquidity as in view of this study this would be irrelevant. This study only 
focuses on liquidity of stocks traded on the exchanges. However, what we will discuss and 
look more in detail is that there are also considerable differences between securities values 
because of differences in liquidity.
2.1 Defining Liquidity
Dubofsky et al (1984) state that there are two aspects to liquidity: how fast a desired 
transaction can be made at the prevailing market price and the price concession that must be 
offered to sell shares within a given period.
“In a perfectly competitive market, there is infinite liquidity since any number of shares can 
be sold instantaneously at the market clearing price” (Dubofsky et. al, 1984). As is clear, in 
most cases infinite liquidity does not exist, nor is it cost free. The execution of a desired 
transaction is thus related to the number of the shares on the buy and on the sell side and the 
prevailing bid-ask spread. Liquidity in the sense of limited price changes and speed of
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execution is possible only so long as an asset’s fundamental value or equilibrium price is 
unchanged.
OMX describes liquidity on its web-pages as follows: “liquidity is characterized by high 
turnover, or a high level of trading activity, in a company’s share. High turnover, and thereby 
liquidity, is the result of the combination of a small spread and a high order depth’’. According 
to Shen et al (2001) liquid markets will be characterized by a narrow spread and illiquid by a 
wide spread. Eventually it would thus seem that there is no one definition for liquidity, but 
that it is a combination of the bid-ask spread, market depth and total turnover. In the 
following we discuss the importance of liquidity especially in asset pricing and how it could 
be measured. The measures are themselves a part of forming liquidity.
2.2 Liquidity in Asset pricing
Organized stock markets are viewed as places where people can transfer their ownership in 
corporations without any direct negotiations or contact to the other party of the trade. It is 
believed that the markets are efficient (efficient market theory) and that the price on the 
market is correct at any point in time. However, markets can serve their purpose only if they 
are liquid.
“It is generally accepted that liquidity, marketability or transaction costs are import attributes 
of assets which influence investors’ portfolio decisions. Since investors care about expected 
holding period returns net of trading costs, less liquid (and more costly to trade) assets need to 
provide higher gross returns compared to more liquid assets.’’ Datar et al. (1998).
Viewing liquidity as one factor in pricing a security in an investment decision is not far 
fetched. As discussed earlier fully liquid market is a market where transactions can be 
executed without a cost. Lack of liquidity can thus be viewed as a cost and thus the more 
illiquid the security / market the more an investor will have to pay transaction costs. Amihud 
et al (1986) proposed that investors are anticipating having to sell their security some time in 
the future. If a security is highly illiquid they recognize they will have to face transaction cost
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at the time of the sale. “Enhanced liquidity lowers the cost of equity capital by reducing the 
compensation required by investor for trading difficulty.” (Amihund et al. 1986). They also 
showed in their study that in equilibrium, illiquid assets would be held by investors with 
longer investment horizon (Datar et. Al 1998). Amihud et al stated that due to differences in 
liquidity considerable differences between securities values, on the same market, exists. Also 
Mashall (2005) concluded that “There have been many studies conducted on the issue that 
liquidity has been found to be a determinant of stock returns in large hybrid quote-driven 
market”.
According to Amihud and Mendelson there has not been much attention paid to liquidity in 
asset pricing prior to their study in 1986. “The classical Capital Asset Pricing Model pays no 
attention to the effects of asset liquidity and investor holding periods on expected returns”. 
Also many other studies refer to Amihud and Mendelson’s study as one of the first to examine 
the role of liquidity in asset pricing.
Amihud et al. thus studied the effects of differences in liquidity on asset prices and expected 
returns. They found that expected return is an increasing and concave function of the bid-ask 
spread. This was tested on data within the NYSE, an organized stock exchange such as the 
Helsinki Stock Exchange most relevant to this study. They found that, after adjusting for risk, 
an increase of 1 percent in the bid-ask spread was associated with an additional monthly 
return of 0,21 percent.
“Overall the empirical relationship between return and liquidity in the large hybrid quote- 
driven markets of the US (the NYMEX, AMEX and Nasdaq) is well documented. Studies 
have found a negative relationship, confirming the existence of a positive liquidity premium 
as proposed by theoretical papers“ (Mashall 2005). Since liquidity is studied in large markets, 
one could make the assumption that the theory might not hold with smaller markets, such as 
the OMX. Luckily Jun, Marathe and Shawky (2003) analyzed liquidity and stock market 
returns in emerging equity markets. Although the Finnish stock market can not be viewed as 
emerging market, the study is beneficial when viewing the behavior of those highly illiquid 
stocks at the Helsinki Stock Exchange. Jun et al. (2003) discovered a positive correlation 
between the aggregate market liquidity as measured by turnover ratio, trading value and the
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turnover-volatility multiple. This positive correlation between stock returns and market 
liquidity is consistent with the findings in developed markets, implying that the theories of the 
“large markets” can also hold for smaller markets.
Lack of liquidity has also been blamed for the stock market crash of October 19th, 1987. “hr 
dramatic language, the Brady Report painted a picture of enormous waves of institutional 
selling driving down prices excessively. The report claimed that such sellers suffered from an 
“illusion of liquidity”.” Genotte and Leland (1990). The market had appeared to be liquid in 
terms, that until then, there had always been bid ask spread maintained. When the institutional 
selling begun, market makers and investors shifted their bids downwards to match the 
increased selling. As more selling appeared the bids came even lower and thinner since there 
was real uncertainty at what price the stocks could be sold again. This drove the market down 
as the amount of buyer was diminishing and the number of sellers increasing.
2.3 How to measure liquidity
As part of this study is to discover whether market making improves liquidity, it thus 
important to discuss the different ways one can measure it. There are a number of studies on 
measuring liquidity over different exchanges and asset classes. However, most of the studies 
done have not been able to agree on one measurement and the accuracy of it.
One of the first ones to use the quoted bid-ask spread as measurement for market liquidity and 
test the relationship between stock returns and liquidity were Amihud and Mendelson in 1986. 
According to Amihud et al. a natural measure for the cost of liquidity is the bid-ask spread. 
They argued that expected returns are an increasing function of bid-ask spreads. “If investors 
value securities according to their returns on net of trading costs, then they should require a 
higher expected return for higher spread stock in order to compensate for the higher cost of 
trading. “ Thus there is a direct link between liquidity and corporate cost of capital. “They 
showed that in equilibrium illiquid assets would be held by investors with longer investment 
horizons. As a result of this horizon clientele, they argued, the observed asset returns must be 
an increasing and concave function of the transaction costs” (Datar et al. 1998). Amihud et al
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(1989) were able to discover evidence on the liquidity premium, relating to the bid-ask 
spread.
However, subsequent empirical evidence in support of liquidity is somewhat mixed. Eleswara 
and Reinganum (1993) examined the same period and Amihud and Mendelson using the same 
proxy for liquidity. However, this time they found that the association between the bid-ask 
spread and the stock returns were mainly applicable to January (Datar et al. 1998). This was 
contradicted Brennan and Subrahmayam in 1996, who segregated the cost of transacting into 
a variable and fixed component. They found no seasonality in liquidity premium, but found 
some evidence in favor of the Amihud and Mendelson model. “In particular B&S find the 
concave relationship between asset returns and transaction costs with respect to the variable 
cost component. However, they did not find it with respect to the fixed cost component, 
which is inconsistent with A&M’s horizons clientele effect. In summary, the question whether 
liquidity affects asset return or not remains unsolved thus far“ ( Datar et al 1998).
The discussions are about the lack of order based measures, measuring the liquidity trough 
bid-ask spread, while it doesn’t take into account the depth and volumes of the market. 
According to Bernstein (1987) on of the most intuitive means would me to divide the dollar 
volume of trading day by average absolute percentage change on price - which he continues 
“is, in fact, the most popular measure of liquidity used in use in the marketplace.
Maybe the inconclusive studies on the return-spread relationship led to the development of 
other proxies for liquidity. One another commonly used proxy for liquidity is the turnover 
ratio. There are several different types of formulas derived from the basic turnover. “Turnover 
rate is defined as the total (dollar) value of the trading in a stock over a given period by 
market capitalization” (Marshall 2006). One reason for the popularity of turnover as measure 
could well be the simplicity and availability. Data on turnover is reported regularly (usually at 
least daily) and it is easy to access, where as bid-ask spread during the trading day can be hard 
to obtain at least for a longer time period. This enables studies to capture variations in 
liquidity of assets across large number of stocks over long period of time.
Haugen and Baker (1996) found a statistically significant negative return-turnover rate 
relationship for stocks that were part of the Russell 300 stock index, meaning higher returns
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for less liquid stocks. Datar et al (1998) confirmed this in their study with NYSE and Nasdaq 
stocks. They investigated the relationship after also controlling for the firm size, book to 
market ration and the firm beta. They also excluded outliers by disregarding the lowest 1% 
and highest 1% observations of turnover rate. Their findings also supported the predictions of 
the Amihud et al (1989) by finding that stock returns are decreasing function of the turnover 
rates. However, in contrast to the findings of Eleswarapu et al. (1993), they did not find any 
evidence supporting the January seasonality.
It would seem that the number of different liquidity measures is greater than the number used 
by papers testing the relationship between return and liquidity. Aitken and Winn (1997) report 
that there are some 68 extant measures for liquidity used in literature. They also report that 
there is little or no correlation between many of these metrics.
Marshall (2006) argued that although liquidity has been found to be a determinant of stock 
returns in large hybrid quote-driven markets, the relationship between return and liquidity in 
small pure order-driven markets is less clear. Different proxies have produced different and 
conflicting results. Since Helsinki Stock Exchange is rather small, order driven market the 
findings of Marhall are highly relevant. Marshall used Weighted Order Value in his studies 
examining the return-liquidity relationship at the Australian Stock Exchange. WOV combines 
bid and ask depth and weights orders in the order book by the probability that they will be 
executed. His findings were consistent with the findings of previous studies as he indicated 
the existence of a positive liquidity premium, i.e. investors need to be compensated with 
higher return to hold less liquid stocks.
An interesting (side)notion about liquidity is that there is no hedge for it. “While an investor 
can reduce security risk by holding a diversified portfolio or by hedging into capital market, 
there is little he can do on his own to avoid cost of illiquidity”. Amihud et al (1986). 
However, according to Amihud et. Al “a longer holding period thus reduces the amortized 
transaction cost per unit of time. A related consideration is the probability of the investor 
having to sell the stock before the end of his holding period. The lower this probability the 
lower the required compensation for liquidation costs included in the stock.”
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In addition to the return relationship, we will now discuss few other proxies for measuring 
liquidity.
2.3.1 Bid-Ask Spread
In the early studies bid-ask spread has linked to the existence and magnitude of dealer / 
specialist costs. It has been presumed that given a competitive environment spreads will be 
greater the greater the cost to dealer / specialist providing immediacy seen as a cost (Cohen et 
al 1979).
Since the late 80’s the view of the bid-ask spread has changed some. Although it still seen as a 
cost, it not viewed so much as cost of the market maker / specialist but a cost of transacting, 
and according to Fleming et al. the bid-ask spread is a commonly used measure of market 
liquidity.
As stated earlier, one of the first studies to discuss this is Amihud and Mendelson (1986). 
They used bid-ask spread as a proxy for measuring liquidity, as have done many other studies 
(Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993), Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996)). “Illiquidity can be 
measured by the cost of immediate execution. An investor willing to transact faces a tradeoff: 
he may either wait to transact at a favorable price or insist on immediate execution at the 
current bid or ask price. The quoted ask price includes a premium for immediate buying and 
the bid price similarly reflects a concession required for immediate sale. Thus, a natural 
measure of illiquidity is the spread between the bid and ask prices, which is the sum of the 
buying premium and the selling concession. (Amihud et al 1986).
Fleming (2003) has the same opinions and according to him bid-ask directly measures the 
cost of executing a small trade, the cost being the spread. “It’s advantages are that it can easily 
be calculated and data is widely available". (Fleming 2003)
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However, using bid-ask spread to measure market’s liquidity trading might not be entirely 
true. It would exclude the fact that the spread might also be a product of informed trading. Wu 
(2003) studied the information flow, volatility and spreads of infrequently traded Nasdaq 
stocks. He found that the proportion of information-based trading is negatively correlated with 
trading activity. “Infrequently traded stocks generally have a higher percentage of informed 
trading than frequently traded stocks. The result of cross-sectional spread regression show that 
effective bid-ask spreads are a positive function of the percentage of informed trading”. Since 
all of the shares at OMX with market making can be categorized as infrequently traded 
stocks, bid-ask spread might not be the best measurement, if just comparing with other 
companies. However, since the main objective of this study is to define the possible effect of 
market making on a stock’s liquidity and since one of criteria for the market makers is a set 
bid-ask spread, we will use the spread as a proxy.
Like in many other cases, there are also those who disagree about using the bid-ask spread as 
a measure. Brennan et al. (1996) discuss the return-illiquidity relationship and how to measure 
it. They argued that bid-ask spread is a noisy measure of illiquidity as many large trades occur 
outside the spread and many small trades occur within the spread. This is rather good point, 
and is often to be seen with the trading of illiquid shares. The market price of the share is not 
necessarily the trade price as with illiquid shares, larger volumes are traded outside the spread 
to compensate for the illiquidity of the share. Thus the bid-ask spread does not reflect the 
liquidity of the share. Also, the downside of just measuring the spread is that the quotes are 
valid for only a small moment in time and the volumes behind the prices can be small. We 
will thus discuss other measures of liquidity.
2.3.2 Depth
In addition to just looking at the bid-ask spread it is also important to take one step further and 
look at the depth of the order book. The amount of shares than can be traded at the bid-ask 
spread will give indication of the market liquidity. As discussed earlier, this combined with 
the bid-ask spread should give an indication of market’s liquidity.
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The importance of market depth to the liquidity can be easily thought in the following: when 
the number of shares to be sold increases in an illiquid market, the depth of the market 
describes how much lower price is to be asked, i.e. what is the price concession a seller has to 
give in order to sell the shares. Thus, when purchasing larger quantities of illiquid stocks, the 
investor might end up paying over the asking price if the depth of the market is not good and 
the number of share available at the market price is less than the buyer needs. In most cases 
with illiquid Finnish shares, the prevailing bid ask prices offer only up to few thousand shares.
2.3.3 Volume
Trading volume would intuitively seem like a valid proxy for market liquidity. One could 
make an assumption that the more certain stock is traded, the more liquid it is. However, can 
it be used to measure the liquidity of one individual share? According to Fleming (2003) 
trading volume is an indirect but widely cited measure of market liquidity.
According to Gopinath et al (2001) public market wide information drives the trading 
volumes of larger companies. However, for small companies the price reaction to the 
information occurs without perceptible increase in trading volume. This would mean that 
prices can change even in the absence of trades for small companies as market makers adjust 
their quotes in response to price changes of large companies or index movements, “another 
implication of this explanation is that when trades of small firms do occur, it is mostly 
because traders are acting on the basis of firm-specific information. They propose that the 
effect of trading frequency on bid-ask spread is conditioned to the firm size. They also found 
that empirical studies of market microstructure using volume as an explanatory variable for 
return volatility have substantially underestimated the effect of asymmetric information. Thus 
the problem with measuring liquidity using volume as proxy is that, that volume can be 
decomposed into informed and liquidity components. If it was to be used as a proxy, these 




Jones. Kaul and Lipson (1994) studied the effect that trading frequency has on the stock. 
Trading frequency does not include trade size, but merely measures the number of trades done 
within a specified interval. Alone it can thus not be a very accurate proxy for liquidity.
2.4 Liquidity and price volatility
Price volatility is an important factor in portfolio management since it is a measure of risk 
involved in the underlying asset. Liquidity plays an important role in the return volatility 
process, as clearly price volatility is a product of proxies used to measure liquidity. In addition 
to just the clear relationship between bid - ask spread and price volatility (a product of the bid 
-ask spread) also trading volumes, number of transactions and of course the market volatility 
are all accountable in the process. Many studies have been done on the subject, finding a 
positive relation, or an association, between asset liquidity and volatility.
“Increased volatility often lowers liquidity, because market markers require a higher 
compensation (reflected in the bid-ask spread) for taking a position in the volatile assets. The 
opposite implication may also hold; for an illiquid asset, an unexpected imbalance in the order 
flow can cause large price changes.” Amihud et al (1989). An unexpected order imbalance 
would force the market maker to adjust his bid -ask spread to compensate for the increased 
risk. This will be discussed later in the study in respect to a market maker’s function in 
providing liquidity and whether or not the operation is effective.
However, although as discussed above, high volatility can be viewed as lowering liquidity by 
presenting higher risk, there are notions for limiting it too much. For example, most market 
places have different restrictions on trading, trying to control the possible unwanted volatility, 
such as restrictions on daily price fluctuations. According to Amihud et al (1989) these kinds 
of restrictions might not desirable if set too strictly. For example; “a rule limiting daily price 
changes to 1 % might reduce volatility, but the liquidity of the market is likely to suffer 
because whenever the rule is binding, market participants are unable to execute mutually
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agreeable trades. In such a case trying to reduce the volatility would lead to drop in liquidity 
at the cost of market efficiency.
Amihud et al. (1989) state that if the objective of a market is to reduce volatility while 
increasing liquidity and keeping asset prices informative, the trading system should reduce the 
friction in the market. It should be designed to reduce the noise variance without altering the 
underlying return variance resulting in lower price volatility, higher liquidity and more 
informative prices.
Explanations such as the inventory explanation and information asymmetry explanation of 
spreads have found a positive relationship between spreads and volatility (Stoll 1978, Amihud 
et al 1989). Infrequently traded stocks tend to have higher variations in order flow and as 
these stocks are traded, there is a higher probability that informed traders may act on private 
information, causing higher return volatility and widening of the bid-ask spreads by market 
makers to compensate for their potential loss to informed traders. (Wu 2004).
Since most of the stocks that have market making agreement at the OMX are rather illiquid it 
should be noted that the price of infrequently traded stocks is more sensitive to informed 
trading than that of frequently traded stocks. This suggests that information arrivals have a 
larger impact on price movements of infrequently traded stocks.
2.5 Liquidity at the HSE
OMX is a Nordic group consisting of the stock exchanges of Denmark, Finland and Sweden. 
In September 2006 the Nordic OMX Group launched a new Nordic market, with new market 
models. Instead of the traditional national lists, the list of Finland, Sweden and Copenhagen 
have been combined and sorted according to market size. New list are large, mid and small 
cap lists. Before and after launching the new lists, there have been discussions in the Finnish 
media that introducing such a large number of new companies to Finnish investors could 
decrease the interest in small, Finnish companies. This could lower the already low liquidity 
and trading volumes of small companies.
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However, since this study is focused on the time before September 2006 it is beneficial to 
look at the liquidity in the previous years at the Helsinki Stock Exchange. Before the 
introduction of a new Nordic list, the HSE had 128 different stocks listed, with 120 different 
companies. Some companies had thus 2 different series listed on the exchange dividing the 
trading volumes even more. In most cases, the other of the shares is highly illiquid with more 
voting power and extremely low free float.
Stocks were separated to different lists, which were the main list, NM-list and I-list. 85% of 
the all shares were traded on the main list. Stock trading volumes at the Helsinki stock 
exchange were 144 708 mil. Euro, 181 161 mil. Euro, 224 960 million Euro, and 231 571 
million during years 2003-2006 respectively. The total trading volume of the five most traded 
stocks amounted up to 126 094 mil. Euro year 2003, 149 575 mil. Euro year 2004, 162 480 
mil. Euro year 2005 and 201 478 million Euro in year 2006. These figures show that the 5 
most traded shares totaled 87%, 83%, 72% and 86% of the total annual yearly trading 
volumes respectively. As the figures clearly indicate, the trading volumes of the remaining 
115 companies are low, creating a number of highly illiquid shares. This study will focus on 




Market maker is a company, which quotes bids and asks in a financial instrument of 
commodity. “A market making service is performed when a broker-dealer is willing to put its 
capital at risk to facilitate the completion of trades by others” (Smidt 1971). Although the 
function of a market maker is common, the operations of market makers can vary with the 
stock exchange. This study is mainly focused on the market making at the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange (HSE). Since most studies are based on the main exchanges such as the AMEX, 
NYSE, NASDAQ and LSE this study will focus on market making in general and later 
discuss market making at the OMX
In some cases market maker is also referred to as a specialist. A Specialist (for example at the 
NYSE) is by function a market maker, as is liquidity provider. To avoid possible confusions 
among readers, term Market Maker (MM) refers to a company that provides bid-ask quotes 
for securities. LP stands for Liquidity Providing contract at the Helsinki Stock Exchange 
(nowadays OMX).
3.2 Market Maker's function
The bid-ask orientated literature recognizes that the arrival of random buy-and-sell orders 
tenders is no synchronous, and as a result perceives that a demand exists for immediacy 
providers who will service buy orders at somewhat higher price and sell orders at a somewhat 
lower price. Hence market makers have been viewed as the suppliers of immediacy and the 
bid-ask spread generally has been viewed as the price they impose. (Cohen et al. 1979)
Objective of market makers is thus to guarantee a certain degree of liquidity in a security by 
setting bid and ask quotes even when other investors / traders are not present in the market. 
They are supposed to maintain market presence and assure price continuity. As discussed
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earlier in section 2 the lack of liquidity is a cost that the investor will need to carry. Market 
makers, as a provider of liquidity, should decrease the bid-ask spread and thus decrease the 
cost of transacting.
The performance and the effects of market makers have since long been under different 
studies. According to Smidt (1971) the main economic criterion relevant to evaluating the 
performance of market-making system is the extent to which it supplies liquidity in depth to 
offset temporary imbalances in supply and demand.
Most literature recognizes two different types of investors on the market. There are those who 
trade purely on volume, i.e. do not make a decision on to invest on the stock by having 
“information” on it, but are looking to buy low and sell high. The other type of an investor is 
information traders, who have some “correct” price for the stock. Black (1986) distinguishes 
between people who trade on basis of information and “noise trading”, which is trading on 
noise as if it were information. “If there were no noise trading, there will be very little trading 
in individual assets. People will hold individual assets, directly or indirectly, but they will 
rarely trade them. “ Black (1986). According Mr. Black an information trader is one who has 
information or insights about stocks and will take the other side of the trade. Now, if the one 
on the other side of the trade would be an information trader, this would have to be taken into 
account. Would the trade still be attractive to one side? “From the point of someone who 
knows what both traders know, one side or the other must be making a mistake. This is where 
noise trading comes into play. “Noise trading is trading on noise as if it were information. 
People who trade on noise are willing to trade even though from an objective point of view 
they would be better off not trading. Perhaps they think the noise they are trading on is 
information. Or perhaps they just like to trade” (Black 1986). As Black continues: “The more 
noise trading there is, the more liquid the markets will be”.
However, if the opposite applies? If markets are very illiquid, the amount of noise traders is 
rather low. In the absence of noise traders the amount of trades will decrease as information 
traders will not find counterparties for trading. This is where the role of market makers 
becomes important. They will trade against information traders, providing liquidity to the 
market.
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One good way of looking at the possible effects of market making has been done by 
researching intra-day patterns. There are several different studies on the subject, researching 
trading volumes, the bid ask spread as well as volatility. Many of these studies have found a 
U-shaped pattem on the market. Mclnish et al (1990) and Mclnish et al (1985) found in two 
different studies a high variance of returns at the beginning and at the end of the trading day. 
In addition, Foster et al 1990 found evidence on U-shaped pattem in the intra-day volumes. 
This implies that the spreads are at the highest right after opening and before closing. This 
was also studied by Abhyankar et al (1997) who studied the spreads, volume and volatility on 
intra-day patterns from the London stock exchange. Their findings were consistent with the 
previous findings: clearly a U shaped pattern in the bid ask spread and also in the return 
volatility. His results suggested that “the bid-ask spread is higher during the two “windows” 
when the market is open but market markers are not obligated to post quotes i.e. outside the 
Mandatory Quote Period” (Abhyankar et al 1997). This would indicate that market making 
has had an effect on the market behavior, decreasing the spreads and volatility, thus implying 
the effectiveness of it.
3.3 Market making internationally
As already discussed in the previous sections, market making, or the function of “specialists” 
has been studied in many ways previously. Most studies have focused on larger international 
markets, where different model appear.
With “old”, traditional market models, such as the NYSE, market makers have enormous 
amount of information relating to the order flows of shares. I.e. they are in between 
transactions managing their inventory. NASDAQ market makers use their own capital, 
research and resources to represent stock and compete with each other to buy and sell stock 
they represent. There are over 500 firms acting as market makers in the Nasdaq-market.
Chung and Zhao (2004) studied the quote revision behavior of Nasdaq market makers. They 
studied in addition to just how price quotes change, how the depth quotes of the market
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makers change over time. They discovered that market makers change depth quotes more 
frequently than spreads. They found that nearly 70% of all revision involves changes in the 
depth, where as only 57% of quote revisions involve changes in the spread.
Ho and Macris (1985) argue that increasing the number of market makers in a security would 
improve the depth of the market. The reasoning behind this is that when only one market 
maker is present, it has the possibility, without the competition of other market makers to use 
the bid-ask spread to recover the cost of market-making. When many market makers compete 
for the trades, they would keep the spread same, just adding quotes (depth) on the market. 
With the absence of other traders, a market maker can adjust the location of the spread 
midpoint in its favor. For example, if the market maker has a short position in the stock, 
acting alone he or she can raise prices, encouraging potential sellers / discouraging buyers.
There are arguments supporting one market maker as well as multiple market makers. The 
collective ability of dealers to carry inventory to absorb imbalances in buying and selling 
activity is much higher (Anand 1990). On the other hand Glosten and Milgrom (1985) found 
an advantage in a specialist, i.e. one market maker system. They found that there can be 
instances where competing market markets will not quote, as all of them expect to lose money 
on a trade. The situation is likely to remain the same until new information is disclosed to the 
market. In a case of a monopolistic market maker, they argue, this is not the case. By keeping 
the market open, i.e. allowing a spread, the market maker could learn some of the information 
of the informed.
3.4 Market Making at the Helsinki Stock Exchange
Until the year 2004 market making had been common in Finland mainly on Finnish 
derivatives. Stock market making (liquidity providing) is relatively new service and before 
year 2004 only few companies on the I-list used the service. At the beginning of LP-service 
there were no set criteria for the market maker. This changed in April 2004 when the Helsinki 
Stock Exchange introduced LP- liquidity providing service for listed companies. The model 
followed that of the Stockholm Stock Exchange. The stock exchange itself does not provide
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liquidity, but instead it provides the framework and closely monitors that market makers 
fulfill their obligations. Before actually becoming a market maker, the broker-dealer must first 
apply to be accepted as a market maker at the exchange. After receiving acceptance the 
market maker can enter into an agreement with a company to provide liquidity for that 
company’s share traded at the stock exchange.
Market making at the Helsinki Stock Exchange (HSE) is some what different than in major 
stock exchanges around the world. At HSE the market maker has its quotes on the trading 
system all of the time, where as f.ex. at NYSE the investor contacts the market maker for a 
quote on a block of shares separately. This is of course mainly due to the electronic trading 
platform available at HSE. What differs probably most are the requirements for the market 
makers - more specifically, the amount of shares that needs to be quoted.
Before the combined Nordic List and the removal of trading lots (September 2006) the quoted 
lot at HSE were relatively small, in most cases 400 to 2000 shares. The requirements were 
drawn upon experiences from the Stockholm Stock Exchange. The market maker was 
obligated to quote at least 4 trading lots with 4 % spread or better.
In September 2006 as trading lots were withdrawn from all the exchanges belonging to OMX, 
and the exchange had to set new criteria for market markets. With the new rules, the market 
maker will have to set quotes for number of shares equal to 4000 euros on the bid and ask 
side. The spreads have remained the same. However, the market making agreements that were 
in place before the removal of trading lots will not be changed. Thus in some cases the Euro 
amount quoted is less than 4000 Euro, in some cases even less than 1000 Euro. Since OMX 
only provides the minimum requirements for the spread and size of the quotes, the company 
and the broker can agree on tighter obligations. In most cases, before entering into the 
agreement with broker-dealers, most companies have agreed on larger lots and better spreads.
It is safe to say that market making at HSE, nor at the OMX were created for institutions, as 
the requirement lot sizes are still very small for larger investors. However, for illiquid stocks a
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market maker could improve the situation as an institution can contact the market maker and 
ask for a quote for a larger lot of shares.
Also a difference with NASDAQ. LSE and HSE is that the first two have a market making 
system of multiple market makers. NASDAQ, for example, has a structure of competing 
market makers, where each market maker competes for customer order flow by displaying 
buy and sell quotations for a guaranteed number of shares (NASDAQ). LSE has always at 
least two market makers on each stock (LSE). Although there are multiple market makers at 
HSE; they are not market making for the same companies.
3.4.1 Situation today
There are currently 34 securities with Liquidity Provider- agreement trading on the Helsinki 
Stock Exchange. The popularity of market making has not vanished although few companies 
have terminated their liquidity providing contracts. 10 new companies have signed the 
agreement during the later half of 2006 or the beginning of 2007.
There are currently 6 active broker / dealers acting as stock market makers on the Helsinki 
Market. These are (in order of for how many shares they are making the market): Nordea 
Bank Finland Plc, FIM Securities Ltd, Kauthing Bank Oyj, EQ Bank Ltd, Pentium AB and 
Opstock.
As the companies can negotiate the amount of share to be quoted, they vary very much. The 
minimum quoted lot, according to the old rules, is 400 shares and according to the new rules 
4000 Euro. Currently the volumes vary front 400 to 20000 shares.
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3.5 Moti vation s for Market Makers
Since market making does involve effort and risk to the broker / dealers, acting as a market 
makers it should also provide some kind of reward. “Market makers earn their income in two 
ways: by managing order and by assuming risk” (Demsetz 1986)
3.5.1 Reward
One direct reward in the Finnish market making agreement is the annual fee paid by the 
company of the underlying share to the market maker. Since there are several liquidity 
provider companies, which compete with each other, the fees paid by the companies are not 
disclosed to the public. According to the head of Derivatives at FIM Securities Pekka 
Ollikainen1, the fees are not substantial and are within of thousands of euros. The fee received 
is thus not the main motivation for the market maker as the price risks in the underlying share 
can easily amount to that. Why would then a market maker enter into a such an agreement?
One possible explanation is pure visibility. The more a market maker provides liquidity, the 
more visibility the brokerage company gets. Also by trading daily on the share, the market 
maker has a better view of the share, i.e. its volumes, who is buying/selling or what the trends 
are. This increases the knowledge the market maker has over the stock and will help with 
trading.
As already discussed earlier, the market maker will also try to manage his inventory and try to 




Market makers face two different costs in addition to the processing cost of trading the stocks. 
As we already pointed out in the earlier section, the bid-ask spread should cover the 
processing costs of doing business. However, there are two additional costs of market making 
that must also be reflected in the spread. Amihud and Medelson (1980), Demsetz (1968) Ho 
and Stoll (1983) and Stoll (1978) emphasized the inventory holding costs of liquidity 
suppliers, where capital is tied to buy the shares. If they are not sold quickly, the market 
maker occur a cost as capital is tied to a non-interest paying asset.
Copeland and Galai (1983), Easley and O’hara (1987) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) 
concentrated on the adverse selection costs faced by liquidity suppliers when traders are 
involved. This cost, more of a risk, is of course the change in the price of the underlying asset. 
If a market maker is unable to sell the asset further, or has to sell it at a lower price, he would 
incur a loss. This is why market makers usually do not take long positions, but try to manage 
their inventory so that the individual (and market risk) is low.
The latter risk can be thought with an example where the market maker is the only seller in a 
rising market. If the market maker is not careful, the risk of short selling exists. Of course 
most market makers have inventory and thus are not naked short on the stock. In such a case 
the market maker would borrow the sold stock and little by little try to buy the shares back, 
with the intention of not increasing the price. If the market maker is not able to borrow the 
shares and the trades have to be settled, he will have to buy the sold shares from the market. If 
no sellers exist, the market maker will drive the price of the share up, at the same time losing 
more and more.
3.6 Moti vatio n s for th e company
Since this study is mainly focused on market making at the OMX, we will only discuss 
motivations applicable to those companies traded there, especially at the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange. Having a market making agreement for the company’s share is not free for the
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company. Although the cost is rather low annually there has to be something to be gained for 
this fee. In the following we will look at some situations and motivations when and why 
companies have decided to get a market maker for their share.
It seems that companies that have signed a liquidity proving agreement have many 
similarities. The average daily turnover on the company’s stock has been and in most cases 
still is rather low. According to the Head of Finance2 of Lännen Tehtaat Oyj,
one of the puiposes was to increase the daily trading volumes and make sure that there are no 
days when zero stocks are traded. The stock of Lännen Tehtaat Oyj had had many zero 
trading days in the past and as the bid-ask spread was over 5% many investors felt that the 
stock was too illiquid.
Most important motivation is of course to make the price formation more accurate. As already 
discussed, better liquidity enhances efficient price formation and thus lowers the 
compensation required by the investor for trading difficulty. This could raise the price of the 
stock.
One reason that has nothing to do with the value of the stock or the volatility is the motivation 
to expand the investor base of a company. Since market making at the OMX is mostly for 
retail investors, this might be a logical way of thinking. In cases where larger amounts of the 
share are owned by institutions as “long term investments”, or where the free float is rather 
low for other reasons, the trading volumes can be rather thin. As more retail customers start 
owning the share, more trading action should arise in the share. As discussed earlier investors 
might not be willing to invest in a company if the exit cost is great. With a market making 
agreement, the investor knows that selling of the shares is possible without having to pay too 
high illiquidity premiums or having no way to exit the investment.
Even if the company would not want to enlarge its investor base, but has a limited free float, 
having a market maker would support the valuation of the company. With a low free float, 
there are not many real buyers or sellers on the market, making it hard for anybody to trade
2 Telephone discussion with Mr. Hannu Hovi, Head of Finance 7.11.2006
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with the stock. With a market maker, the company can be sure that its small/retail investors 
are always able to sell or buy the company’s share no matter what the free float.
One, a bit far fetched, motivation could also be that when the market making commences, the 
broker acting as the marker will start analyzing and selling the company as investment 
opportunity to its clients more. This however, is only speculation since according to Finnish 
Financial Supervision (and also international financial authorities) the analyzing department 
must be independent unit, which doesn’t give out recommendations based what the broker / 
sales department wants, but based on accurate data and measures. However, according to 
public discussions on a website of Finnish paper for investors, the commencing of market 
making shows that the market maker views the company as good and with potential 
(www.arvopaperi.fi). This might not be entirety false either. There is evidence that activities 
of brokerage house analysts increase liquidity (Brennan et al 1995).
3.7 How to measure Market Makers?
A number of different studies have been done on specialists and market makers and how to 
measure them correctly. As discussed earlier, there really is no one correct measure or proxy 
for liquidity. The same thing applies to measuring market making.
According to Bamea (1974) who analyzed the behavior of New York Stock Exchange 
Specialists and developed criteria to assess their market making efficiency, the first to bring 
major insights into the economics of market making was Demsetz. “He considered brokerage 
commissions and the market makers bid-ask spread as the two elements comprising all NYSE 
transaction costs. An implication of his analysis is that the appropriate criterion for evaluation 
the efficiency of the market maker is the size of the bid-ask spread after adjusting for some 
characteristics of his stock” (Bamea 1974).
Demsetz found that the share volume, average price, number of competitive market makers 
and risk are the most important characteristics that affect the bid-ask spread. The question of 
whether the size of the spread is the relevant variable on which specialists should be evaluated
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was discussed by Smidt (1971). He concluded that for an investor selling when a temporary 
excess of supply prevails in the market, the size of the spread is of no relevance. For him. the 
important aspect of the specialist’s activity is the extent to which the specialist reduces his bid 
price because of the temporary supply imbalance. Bamea (1974) pointed out that, the 
implication of Smidt’s thoughts is that specialists are thus not just users of price data 
generated by that process, but actually participants in the price discovery.
Bamea (1974) on the other tried to constmct a performance criterion for the New York Stock 
Exchange Specialists and to their ability to affect price variability. According to Bamea, “the 
price-setting behavior of the specialists, at times when trading imbalances prevail in the 
market, is the most important aspect of their performance”
Combining most elements of liquidity Smidt (1971) suggested three main criteria for 
evaluations. He suggested that market makers (in his case specialists) should be evaluated by 
looking at the bid-ask spread, continuity and liquidity in depth.
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4 Hypothesis
This study examines if the commencement of market making has any effect on the stock 
liquidity. We look at stocks traded at the Helsinki Stock Exchange (part of the OMX Group), 
which have signed a LP-agreement. Since the main objective of a market making is to add 
liquidity to the market by offering bid and ask quotes, the hypothesis of the study is that 
market making agreement has an effect on stock’s liquidity and on the bid-ask spread. As 
discussed in section 2. there are many measures for liquidity. In this study, we will test the 
hypothesis by studying the intraday bid-ask spread, its volatility and turnover.
Also, following previous argument, the hypothesis follows that if liquidity is increased, the 
price of the stocks should rise. Investors should require a “risk premium” for holding an 
illiquid asset, thus keeping the stock price lower than (more liquid) peers. As the stock 
becomes more liquid the premium should be smaller, thus increasing the stock price after the 
market making has commenced.
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5 Data and methods
5.1 Data Description
The data used in the study consists of two different data sets. First, for the measurement of 
intraday bid-ask spread and the standard deviation of the spread, we use intraday data 
obtained from Helsinki Stock Exchange. The data consists of intraday bid - ask quotes for 
each of the underlying with 15 minute intervals for the whole trading day. The data set was 
available for 40 days prior to the commencing of market making and 40 days after. In cases 
where the range of the data was not sufficient for the underlying to be included in the average 
calculations, the underlying is left out of the average intraday calculations.
When calculating turnover, stock performance or volatility, daily data is used. This data 
consists of daily trading volume (number of shares) and closing prices. It has been obtained 
from the Helsinki Stock Exchange web-pages or such data vendors as Reuters and 
Bloomberg.
Table 1 exhibits the underlying used in this study as well as the data ranges for intraday 
measurements as well as for daily data range.
Underlying TradingCode Commencing of LP Intraday Data Range Daily Data Range
Aspocomp Group Oyj ACG1V 1.4.2005 1.2.2005 - 1.6.2005 3.10.2004 - 28.9.2005
Atria Yhtymä Oyj atrav 4.4.2005 4.2.2005 - 2.6.2005 6.10.2004 - 1.10.2005
Compnenta Holding Oyj CTH1V 4.1.2005 4.11.2004 - 4.3.2005 8.7.2004 - 3.7.2005
Cencorp Oyj CNC1V 3.1.2006 3.11.2005 - 3.3.2006 7.7.2005 - 2.7.2006
Efore Oyj EFOIV 2.11.2004 2.9.2005 - 2.1.2006 6.5.2004 - 1.5.2005
Etteplan Oyj ETT1V 21.12.2004 21.10.2004 - 21.2.2005 24.6.2004 - 19.6.2005
EVI1V EVI1V 13.6.2005 13.4.2005 - 12.8.2005 15.12.2004 - 10.12.2005
Honkarakenne Oyj В HONBS 29.10.2004 2.5.2004 - 27.4.2005
HK Ruokatalo Oyj HKRAV 6.6.2005 6.4.2005 - 5.8.2005 8.12.2004 - 3.12.2005
Julius Tallberg Oyj JTKBS 29.10.2004 2.5.2004 - 27.4.2005
Larox Oyj LARBS 2.9.2004 6.3.2004 - 1.3.2005
Lemminkäinen Oyj LEM IS 5.10.2004 8.4.2004 - 3.4.2005
Lännen Tehtaat Oyj LTE1S 14.11.2005 14.9.2005 - 13.1.2006 18.5.2005 - 13.5.2006
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Martela Oyj MARAS 1.11.2004 5.5.2004 - 30.4.2005
Rapala Oyj RAP IV 3.1.2005 3.11.2004 - 3.3.2005 7.7.2004 - 2.7.2005
Raute Oyj RUTAV 11.1.2005 11.11.2004 - 11.3.2005 15.7.2004 - 10.7.2005
Satama Interactive Oyj SAT1V 9.8.2005 9.6.2005 - 7.10.2005 9.6. - 7.10.2005
Solteq Oyj STQ1V 4.11.2004 8.5.2004 - 3.5.2005
Tekla Oyj TLA IV 1.8.2005 1.6.2005 - 30.9.2005 2.2.2005 - 28.1.2006
Teleste Oyj TLT1V 1.8.2005 1.6.2005 - 30.9.2005 2.2.2005 - 28.1.2006
Waah to Group S WAT IS 12.10.2004 15.4.2004 - 10.4.2005
Waahto Group К WATKV 12.10.2004 15.4.2004 - 10.4.2005
Table 1: Stocks used in the study and their data ranges
It should be noted, that there are currently more companies with an LP agreement. Due to a 
change in the trading system of HSE, the range of the data varied by underlying and some of 
the underlying with LP had to be excluded from the study as not enough prior to LP data was 
available.
It is recognized that the sample used to study the possible effects of market making on 
individual shares is small. However, there are currently only 34 companies with market 
makers, which by itself alone would not be enough to make statistical conclusions. However, 
since this is the situation, the only option is to conduct the study with the given environment..
We also use closing price and daily trading volume (number of shares traded) to measure 
possible abnormal returns over the period before and after market making. Also, in order to 
measure price volatility closing prices are used. For these measures some of the underlying 
that were excluded in the intraday spread study have been included. Also, in addition to using 
the time range of 40 trading days before and after the commencing of market making, we 
have also used a longer time period. Longer time period provides more measuring points thus 
creating reliable data. The longer time period consists of data of 6 calendar months before and 
after commencement of market making. As calendar month do not necessarily divide equally 
into trading days, the trading days used in the study have been equalized. In the original data 
ranges varied from to 122 to 127 days before and 86 to 129 days after. Cencorp Oyj had only 
started its LP market making recently and thus has not enough data for the 6 calendar month 
measurements. It will thus be excluded from the measurements. 122 trading days is the
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minimum amount of days that will allow the use of the other stocks and so it will be used as 
the amount of days before and after the commencing of LP for all stocks.
5.2 Description of methods
In order to measure the possible effects of market making, it is necessary to look at each 
definition of liquidity separately and by combining them.
To measure the effectiveness of market making on the bid - ask spread and the effective 
pricing, the study examines and compares intraday data 2 months before the commencing of 
market making and 2 months after. Study will look at the intraday spread and its volatility.
5.2.1 Bid - ask spread
We measure possible effects of market making using bid-ask spread as the proxy. As 
discussed earlier the spread is a transaction cost and one of objectives of market making is to 
reduce the spread in order to increase liquidity.
For each separate underlying the daily spread is calculated as an average of the intra day 
spreads with 15 minute intervals. Due to the illiquidity of the stocks in the sample, some of 
the spread data is insufficient. As in some cases during the day only bid or ask was available. 
It is argued that this does not mean that no-one would have been willing to buy or sell the 
shares at any price below (over) the ask (bid) price. The missing bid or ask has been inserted 
by using the maximum spread of that trading day multiplied by 1.10. It is thus assumed that 
counterparty had been found with the additional 10% premium on the spread.
This problem mostly occurred before the commencing of the market making, which could be 
explained by the fact that the criteria for market making calls for quoting 85% of the trading 
day. Should the market maker want to wait a few minutes to see at what levels the stock starts
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trading, or if there are some news on the stock, the start of quoting might be delayed by some 
minutes, thus explaining the lack of quotes in the early trading session. This same 
phenomenon might also be visible just before the trading ends as market makers turn off their 
quoting machines few minutes prior to the end.
After calculations of individual spreads, the average of all spreads is calculated. The 
calculations are done so, that equal number of trading days before and after the commencing 
of LP are used for each of the underlying. If no data is available for an underlying (thus the 
range of the data has not been sufficient), the underlying was excluded from the calculations. 
There were 14 different underlying with 39 days prior and after commencing of LP that were 
used.
5.2.2 Volatility of bid-ask spread
In order to be able to sell the shares during any time of the trading day, it is important that 
bid-ask spread does not vary within the trading day nor from day to another. Liquid stocks, 
for example Nokia’s share traded at the Helsinki Stock exchange has a spread that remains 
almost constant (at 0,01 Euro). The investor can also be sure that the lack of a bid/offer will 
not increase trading costs the following day, should he decide to sell/buy the shares.
We have first measure the intraday spreads as a percentage spread calculated from the bid 
price. After this a standard deviation of the intraday spreads, with 15 minute intervals, was 
calculated for each stock separately. We have then measured the day to day volatility of the 
bid-ask spread by looking at average of all daily standard deviations from time T-40 to T+40.
Again, the calculations are done so, that equal number of trading days before and after the 
commencing of LP are used for each of the underlying. If no data is available for an 
underlying (thus the range of the data has not been sufficient), the underlying was excluded 
from the calculations. There were 14 different underlying with 40 days prior and after 
commencing of LP that were used. It is the assumption of the writer, that if designated market
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maker is functioning well, the standard deviation of the bid ask spread should decrease with 
the commencing of LP as the spread should be more stable.
In addition to looking at the average of the 14 stocks, we also look at the bid-ask spread 
volatility on each stock separately. This is again done by calculating the standard deviation of 
the spread over 15 minute intervals over the period of days before and after the market 
making.
5.2.3 Stock performance
Efficient pricing of an illiquid security can be difficult as investors want a risk premium for 
larger spreads: “Enhanced liquidity lowers the cost of equity capital by reducing the 
compensation required by investor for trading difficulty.” (Amihund et al. 1986). If market 
making at the really increases stock liquidity and Amihud et al are correct in their theory, it 
should also be visible in the performance of the stocks in our sample. With the increase in 
liquidity, the stock price should increase as the risk premium by the investors for holding the 
asset lowers.
This will only give some insight on the possible price developments. If LP was to 
automatically raise the performance of the share (as stated earlier due to the increase in 
liquidity) there should be an increase across all shares at the midpoint of the data range (time 
T when LP commences). The rate of price change will be calculated from the closing prices, 
which have been rebased to a value of 100 at T-122. The performance of each stock will then 
be measured until T+122.
In addition, since the few past years have been very bullish at the Helsinki Stock Exchange 
the improvement in the stock performance alone does not insure that it is market making 
effecting the prices. We will thus compare the performances of the individual shares to a 
benchmark to see if a trend of abnormal performance really exists. We will use OMX 
Helsinki 25 index (previously HEX25) and the main index, OMX Helsinki All Share 
(previously HEX-index), to see if the performance of the share is really due to the trend. Each
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stock is viewed separately against the respective performance of the indices. We will thus 
compare the movements on the stock with the movements on the indices on the respective 
days. The change in the closing price or value is calculated log normally ln(T/T-l) with all 
stocks and indices first rebased to a value of 100, which is the value at T-122, where T is the 
time when the market making has commenced.
OMX Helsinki 25 index consists of 25 most actively traded stocks on the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange and is a capitalization weighted, where maximum weight of one company is limited 
to 10 percent where as OMX Helsinki All Share includes all the shares listed on the Helsinki 
Stock Exchange. We recognize that it would be wise to compare the performance of the 
shares with other individual shares within the same sector or with the industry sector. 
However, due to the illiquidity of many of the comparable companies, we feel that 
comparison with main indices is the best alternative, as they present a better picture of the 
overall market situation. For example in consumer Staples, to which Atria Yhtymä Oyj and 
HK Ruokatalo Group Oyj belong, Kesko has the weight of 69% and represents (according to 
the opinion of the author) a different genre. In case of Tekla Oyj. we could compare the 
performance of Tekla with the Information Techonlogy Index. However, since Nokia 
represents over 92% of the index, it is just the same if only Nokia share is used. Again, in 
opinion of the author, comparing Tekla Oyj, which produces software for building companies 
and a mobile phone manufacturer will not improve the reliability of the study. In addition, we 
feel that indices are the indication of market trend, i.e. if the market is plain bullish or if the 
stock really outperforms in a bearish market.
Abnormal returns would merely indicate that one of the motivations for companies to obtain 
market making would hold. If the current liquidity does not reflect the current share price 
correctly and when this liquidity increases, the price should improve. This would be 
consistent with Amihund et al. who in 1986 argued that investors want a premium for less 




As stated earlier in the study, one proxy for stock liquidity is simply trading volumes. To 
compare the trading volumes, we examine the volumes of 21 of the shares with a market 
maker.
We look at the volumes of 122 trading days before the commencing of the market making (T- 
122) and 122 after (T+122). We examine the possible change in the average trading volume 
(number of shares per day) as a total. The changes will be looked on individual stock 
separately. If the hypothesis holds, introducing a market maker should improve liquidity and 
thus increase trading volumes, conditional to the hypothesis that trading volume is a proxy for 
liquidity.
5.2.5 Price Volatility
As discussed earlier in the study, price volatility is an important factor in portfolio 
management. Due to this, possible evidence on volatility will be the second main objective of 
this study.
We measure the price volatility of each stock before and after commencing of market making 
by measuring the standard deviation of the stock price return for the two 122 day periods 
separately. The daily closing price is used to calculate the daily price fluctuations with the
X v — xfollowing formula: —— ------ where n = T - 122 to T + 122. The standard deviation was
n — 1
then multiplied by yearly trading days equal to -%/252 to reflect the annual volatility.
Market making of a share is thought to reduce stock price volatility as more liquidity is 
provided, by also increasing the depth of the market. However, since most of the stocks
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analyzed are highly illiquid we expect to see some increase in price volatility due to lack of 




After re-setting all securities to reflect the same time periods, i.e. 40 days before the 
commencing of the market making and 40 days after we show that the average of average 
spreads had a reaction to the commencing of market making on the security. The average of 
the average intraday spreads fell from an average of 1.49 % to 1.15 %. This accounts for a 




Graph 1: Combined Daily Average intraday spread measured 40 days before and 40 after the 
commencement of market making.
If market making is supposed to lower the bid-ask spread, it should be visible across selection 
as a rule. Graph 2 exhibits the daily averages of bid ask spreads for each stock separately for 
the same time period. The commencement of Market making is indicated by an arrow and 
straight.
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Graph 2: Average Daily intraday spreads measured 40 days before and 40 after the 
commencement of market making.
In most cases we can observe a clear improvement in the spreads, or at least the range of the 
daily average spreads is narrower. However, there is no clear lowering trend line in all of the 
stocks. In 3 cases the average daily spread increased after commencing of the market making. 
The best improvement was in case of Componenta Holding Oyj, where the average intraday 
spread fell from an average of 2,12 % to 0,91 %.
The individual spread details can be found at the table 3 below. As can be seen the maximum 
of average daily spreads were less than 4% in all cases except one after the commencing of 
the LP. This would indicate the maximum spread allowed for market makers at the HSE has 
not been violated. In one case (with the average maximum spread of 4,52%) based on the 
intraday data, the spread was high just before the closing of the market. Since market makers 
only have to quote 85% of the trading day, a spread larger than allowed for market makers 
was to be expected. Before the market making had commenced, the maximum average spread 
had been rather large, up to 7,6 % as in case of Rapala.
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Spread ACGIV ATRAV CTHIV CNC IV
Before After Before After Before After Before After
Minimum 0,32 % 0,40 % 0,25 % 0,15 % 0,36 % 0,32 % 0,78 % 0,85 %
Maximum 1,84% 1,93 % 1,49% 1,65 % 4,57 % 1,88% 2,05 % 1,84%
Average 0,74 % 0,96 % 0,70 % 0,56 % 2,12 % 0,91 % 1,08 % 1,16 %
Spread EFOIV ETT1V EVI1V HKRAV
Before After Before After Before After Before After
Minimum 0,54 % 0,50 % 0,41 % 0,62 % 1,09% 1,04 % 0,26 % 0,10%
Maximum 1,67 % 1,92 % 2,99 % 2,69 % 4,31 % 4,52 % 1,49 % 1,40%
Average 0,98 % 0,79 % 1,28% 1,49% 2,82 % 2,39 % 0,74 % 0,53 %
Spread LTE1S RAP IV RUTAV SAI IV
Before After Before After Before After Before After
Minimum 0,28 % 0,30 % 0,72 % 0,72 % 0,88 % 0.68 % 1,12 % 0,82 %
Maximum 3,09 % 2,02 % 7,69 % 3,74 % 4,03 % 3,32 % 4,96 % 2,30 %
Average 1,18 % 1,00% 2,79 % 1,80 % 1,87 % 1,46% 2,42 % 1,34%
Spread TLA IV TLT1V
Before After Before After
Minimum 0,44% 0,41 % 0,26 % 0,24 %
Maximum 3,08 % 2,33 % 2,08 % 1,30 %
Average 1,36% 1,14 % 0,74 % 0,51 %
Table 2: Average intraday spreads 40 days before and 40 days after the commencement of 
market making
Graph 3 exhibits the distribution of the average spread for the time period before and after 
market making. It shows the distribution of the average spreads calculated for each stock 
separately. Previously we have looked at averages of the average spreads, i.e. one days’ 
average averaged over all stocks. What is visible from the chart, is that the period after the 
market making has had lower spreads over the days. And only one where the average spread 
was over 4%. With market making, there are no larger spreads.
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Graph 3: Distribution of Average Daily Spread
It is our conclusion that based on the available data one can not conclude that market making 
on a stock would automatically reduce the bid-ask spread. However, market making would 
seem to limit the area of the spread, which does imply a lower risk on a stock. This is one of 
the main arguments supporting market making functionality at the OMX. Findings would also 
be consistent and support the findings of Tevanen (2007) who found that the closing spreads 
had diminished, but was unable to measure the real intraday spreads. The study also indicates 
that the spread volatility would seem to be lower, as the spread is more concentrated on the 
narrower (1%- 2%) end. We will look at the volatility of the bid-ask spread in the following 
section.
6.2 Bid-Ask Spread Volatility
We have looked at each stocks bid-ask spread within 15 minute intervals and studied the 
standard deviation on average within the day. In addition we took an average of the averages 
to see if a clear trend was imminent. Graph 4 displays the combined average of the standard 
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Graph 4: Volatility of average intraday spread measured 40 days before and 40 after the 
commencement of market making
Since the trend on the daily averages is some what downwards pointing, we also calculated 
the standard deviation on intraday data for each stock separately. All intraday spreads within 
the days before market making had a standard deviation of 0,34%. The combined standard 
deviation of the bid-ask spread then fell after the commencement of the market making to 
0,26%.
The following graph presents the average intraday standard deviation of the bid-ask spread 
before and after market making for each stock separately. Again, like in bid-ask spread the 
results do not give evidence that market making would always lower the volatility of the bid- 
ask spread. In three cases the average standard deviation of the spread grew some. However, 
what is interesting is that in some cases standard deviation of the intraday spread almost 
halved, which would imply that the prices on the trading board would have varied more 
before the commencement of the LP. This would be consistent with the results obtained from 
studying the size of the bid ask spread. Although it did not show clear evidence of 
improvement, there were results pointing to the direction that market making made the spread 
more stable, thus lowering the volatility of the spread during the trading day. These would 
consistent with the previous international studies, which have found less volatility on the 
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Graph 5: Spread intraday volatility measured with 15 minute intervals.
6.3 Stock performance - abnormal performance
Graph 6 displays the average stock return of 21 of the shares with a market making 
agreement, which (in the graph) starts on the day 123 for all shares. As can be seen the 
improvement on average stock performance for all the shares, no matter on which calendar 
day the market making in real life begun, becomes apparent. The stocks gained on average 
4,27 % on the 122 trading days before the commencement of the market making, after which 
they gained, on average 13.25 % during the following 122 trading days. In the graph, the date 
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Graph 6: Average price return for period -122 to 122 trading days. Day 123 marks the 
commencement of market making.
These results are in line with previous studies conducted, and could be explained by theorem 
that investors wanting a premium for less liquid stock. Also Tevanen (2007) obtained similar 
results. He found increasing prices of about 4.2% which were statistically significant for 
stocks with a market maker he evaluated. As the stocks became more liquid, the risk premium 
for holding the asset dropped, thus increasing the asset price.
We also looked at the stocks separately. Graph 7 displays the price movements of the 
individual shares. As can be seen, the performance of some of the shares performed poorly 
after the market making on the stock began. What is visible from the chart is that the daily 
price movements tend to become larger after the market making has begun. This could be 
explained by that before market making the amount of trading was rather low, thus creating a 
number of days where the stock price did not move at all. When the market making begun, the 
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Graph 7: Stock performance of individual shares during period -122 to 122 trading days. Day 
123 marks the commencement of market making.
Although these results are clearly inline with the studies of Tevanen (2007), they overlook 
one important aspect. As already discussed in chapter 5 the recent years at OMX (and also 
globally) have been very bullish and thus an increase over any period, over any stock could be 
visible. Therefore it is vital to compare the price performance of the stocks with the 
performance of indices for the same period. That is, instead of just measuring the price 
performance, the abnormal performance should be looked at.
In the following, we studied the performance of the individual stocks and the performance 
with two main Helsinki indices. We compared the return of the stock with the return of an 
index for the same period. If market making would actually have a positive effect on the share 
price (as previously indicated) by lowering the risk premium on the stocks, the stocks should 
produce abnormal returns and perform better than the average market or in this case the index. 
Table 3 shows the average of rebased returns for each stock versus the rebased returns on 
OMX Helsinki All Share (HEX-index) index and OMX Helsinki 25 index (HEX25).
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Before market making days 1-122 
After market making days 123-244 









Table 3: Average stock returns compared with indices for the respective periods before and 
after the commencement of market making. All stocks and indices rebased to a beginning value 
of 100 for the respective days.
As can be seen from the table, no evidence of abnormal returns can on average be found. It 
can be seen that, on average, the stock performance was inline compared with the indices, 
before and after market making. The result is not inline with the findings of Tevanen (2007) 
nor with Amihud et al 1986 stating that investors want a risk premium for more illiquid 
stocks. As the stock becomes more liquid the asset price should rise with the lowered required 
rate of return.
By looking at the individual stocks, we see high variance on the performances of the shares.
Table 4 displays the minimum and maximum stock price performances and the median.
Minimun Maximum Median
Before market making days 1-122 -26.54 % 47,00 % -0,78 %
After market making days 123-244 -42,52 % 57,37 % 15,55 %
Total period days 1-244 -50,15 % 91.09% 20,00 %
Table 4: The minimum and maximum stock price performances for the periods before and after 
the commencement of market making on the stocks.
The worst performing stock dropped by over 26% in the first 122 days, while during the same 
period HEX index rose by 2 % and HEX25 -index rose by 5,58%. Best performing stock beat 
the indices by 30% and rose in all 244 days over 90%. All the individual stock price 
performances are graphed and available in the appendix. They are also graphed against the 
performance of both indices.
The average returns studied previously and here overlook one important factor. What can not 
be seen from the figures are possible company notices that caused a reaction to the stock 
price. Unanticipated events could have caused large price changes and surges in trading 
activity, thus increasing the price variance and volumes. This would partially explain the high
46
variances in stock price performance. Unfortunately the examination of price perfonnance in 
this study is not as highly developed that it could take into consideration such events, we 
leave the subject for future studies and so far conclude that no clear abnormal returns were to 
be found after the market making begun, contradicting one of the hypothesis.
6.4 Trading volumes
Trading volumes were measured on average basis. Before the commencing of market making 
the average daily trading volume was 23 031 shares / day, with a high standard deviation of 
28 000. The range of the averages varied from 1077 to 101 866 shares depending on the 
underlying. After the commencement of market making, the average trading volume went up 
by 118% to 50 327, with averages ranging from 3 003 to 298 000 and with an extremely high 
deviation of 91 054. Only one of the shares had a lower average trading volume at the latter 
period of the data. Results for individual stocks are presented in graph 8. Increase in trading 
volumes after the commencement of market making would be consistent with the findings of 











1 [fi cfl, n Л ЛД (!■ ■ — ri ■ J jd
5—I—?—I >—~ m W
1 £
£... > —orI i \ H
-I-------------1
I Tracing Vdume Before Market Making ■ Tracing Vdime After Market Making
Graph 8: Average daily trading volumes calculated for 122 trading days before and after the 
commencement of market making
One downside of looking at the trading volume is that we can not distinct between market 
trades or matched trades. It can be so, that the volumes before or after are due to large block
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trades which could make up large part of the trading volumes, thus downsizing the effect of 
the market making on the trading volumes.
However, although we can not completely disregard the previous argument, we could obtain 
supporting evidence by looking at the number of zero volume trading days. One of the 
motivations to sign a market marking agreement for Lännen Tehtaat Oyj was to decrease the 
number of zero volume trading days. If these expectations are met. the number of those days 
should decrease after introducing market making. Table 5 displays the number of zero volume 
trading days 122 days before and 122 after market making commenced.
ACG1V ATRAV CTH1V EFOIV ETT1V EVI1V HONBS
Before market making days 1-122 0 0 10 0 13 27 41
After market making days 123-244 0 0 2 0 2 31 22
Total period days 1-244 0 0 12 0 15 58 63
HKRAV JTKBS LARBS LEM1S LTE1S MARAS RAP1V
Before market making days 1-122 0 102 52 3 5 53 34
After market making days 123-244 0 72 43 0 2 24 20
Total period days 1 -244 0 174 95 3 7 77 54
RUTAV STQ1V SAI1V TLA1V TLT1V WAT1S WATKV
Before market making days 1-122 42 14 1 12 0 79 108
After market making days 123-244 10 2 0 0 0 29 60
Total period days 1 -244 52 16 1 12 0 108 168
Table 5: The number of zero-volume trading days per stock before and after market making
What is imminent form the table is that some of the stocks were highly illiquid by begun with. 
In total there were 2562 (21 stocks with 122 days) trading days before market making and 
after it. After the market making begun, the amount of zero volume trading days dropped by 
277 to 319 days, where as before the figure stood at 596. This would support the notion of 
increased trading activity and thus also at least partially explain the increases in trading 
volumes.
These findings are consistent with previous studies as well as the “sales arguments” for 
market making. It can not be concluded in this study whether investors are more interested in 
the shares due to the lowered spread volatility or perhaps because a market maker guarantees
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an exit from the investment thus reducing risk, but what can be seen from this study as well as 
the study conducted by Mr. Tevanen (2007), is that market making does have an effect on the 
trading volumes, supporting the initial hypothesis of improved liquidity.
6.5 Stock Price Volatility
We measure the volatility of the shares before and after the commencement of the market 
making. If we look at the historical price data of the shares discussed in section 6.3, one could 
expect the volatility to rise as the reaction in the share price was imminent. Since the stock 
has been illiquid before the commencing of the market making, the stock price might have not 
reflected the “correct price” of the share. After the increase in liquidity, the pricing of the 
share has become more efficient, and thus there is as reaction in the stock price. This would 
explain the increase in the volatility of the share. Of course, in time, the volatility would have 
to become lower in order for the theorem to hold.
Table 6 displays the standard deviations on average. As can be seen, on average, there was 
only very small reduction in the annualized standard deviation with the commencement of 




Before market making days 1-122 33,30 %
After market making days 123-244 31.36 %
Total period days 1-244 32,69%
Table 6: Average annualized standard deviation of sample shares calculated for periods before 
and after the commencement of market making
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Graph 9: Annualized standard deviations for period of 122 trading days before and after the 
commencement of market making and over the total 244 trading day period.
Graph 9 shows the annualized standard deviations for each of the stocks separately before the 
market making (T-122 to T), after the market making (t to T + 122) and for the whole period.
Again, as can be seen from the chart, no clear evidence exists that market making would have 
reduced the volatility of the returns. There was no clear trend between the period before and 
after the market making. Only in 10 cases the standard deviation of the stock price became 
less as market marking commenced, the largest observation with Larox. There the annualized 
standard deviation fell from 75% to 31%. However, since there is clearly no consistency we 
would have to assume this to be random and not be connected with market making at all.
Without looking at the data one could make an assumption that in some cases market making 
would increase the price volatility - quite the opposite of what is hypnotized. However, closer 
look at the data reveals that, as discussed earlier, the volatility would mostly seem to be due to 
technical measuring reasons. Since the standard deviation is measured from the closing prices, 
stocks with a large number of zero volume trading days seem to gain more volatility as 
number of zero trading days decreases.
Also, since the stock has been illiquid before the commencing of the market making, the stock 
price might have not reflected the “correct price” of the share. After the increase in liquidity,
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the .pricing of the share has become more efficient, and thus there is as reaction in the stock 
price. This could partially explain the increase in the standard deviation for some of the 
stocks. Of course, in time, the volatility would have to become lower in order for the theorem 
to hold. This however, would be discussed in a different study in the future. As the amount of 
data is rather limited, it would be better to be cautious about making conclusions about the 
results, at least in using it to support the hypothesis.
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7 Summary and Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to analyze the effects of a market maker on a company’s stock 
at the Helsinki Stock Exchange. The subject has been studied internationally widely, however, 
only few studies have been done on Finnish stocks. The objective of the study was to discover 
if a market maker actually adds value to the company and do investors appreciate it. The main 
hypothesis was that having a market maker reduces the intraday spread as it is limited 
according to the rules set by the stock exchange, which then improves the liquidity of the 
stock. Since liquidity can be defined in many ways, it was observed via intraday spread and 
trading volumes. In addition, we studied the effects of a market maker on a stock’s intraday 
spread volatility. Also, in order to see whether investors value on hypnotized increase in 
liquidity (lower bid-ask spread) we also studied possible effects on stock price, i.e. on the 
return of the stocks. If market making was to be successful also this should have been visible 
on the trading volumes and price volatility as the stocks become more liquid.
We found that a market maker has an effect on the bid-ask spread of a stock. When viewed 
across the sample, he commencement of market making reduced the average intraday bid-ask 
spread measured in 15 minute intervals from 1.49 % to 1.15 %. What could be observed was 
the decline in maximum average intraday spreads. This is an important factor for investors as 
spread represents the concession they have to make in order to sell the stock. Also supporting 
the view of an investor was the drop in intraday bid-ask spread standard deviation. This fell 
on average from 0.34% to 0.26%. However, in some cases the drop was close to 50%. As the 
spread is less volatile, more stable for investors and lessening the impact of timing in the 
investment decision, i.e. the time of the day should not matter is no new information has been 
given to the market. These results did not come as a surprise, since as maintained in many 
studies before one of the functions of market markets is to maintain a fair and orderly market 
and act suppliers of immediacy. The drop in standard deviation would be consistent with the 
findings of Bamea (1974) who firstly found a significant specialist effect on the bid-ask 
spread and also a positive correlation between volatility and the spread. In his assessment of 
market efficiency Logue (1975), stated that due to market maker’s ability to reduce the cost of 
trading (bid-ask spread), the variance of the price series should be less than it otherwise would 
be. Unfortunately the only other study conducted on liquidity providing at the OMX used only
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closing spreads (Tevanen, 2007). However, in that case also, there was evidence of market 
making decreasing the closing spreads in 102 out of the 108 shares.
One argument or even a “sale pitch" for the brokerages selling the service has been that a LP- 
agreement (market making) would increase the value of a company. As the stock becomes 
more liquid investors demand a lower risk premium for holding the asset and thus the stock 
price rises. Such evidence was also found on the previous study conducted on the Nordic 
market. Although we also found evidence that the share price increased on average by 13.25% 
during the days after market making, compared with 4.27% for equal number of trading days 
before the commencement of market making. However, as the Nordic market has been very 
bullish since 2002, we also measured stocks for abnormal returns. As it turned out, there was 
no evidence on abnormal returns. We measured the performance of the individual shares 
against the performance on the main Helsinki Indices and found the performance of the stocks 
to be inline with the performance of the indices. This would contradict the hypothesis of this 
study and the evidence reported by Jun et al. (2003) on the emerging markets and by Tevanen 
(2007) on the OMX. The hypothesis assumed that the premium investors want for holding an 
illiquid asset would be reduced by market making, which would have been in line with the 
studies of Amihud et al (1986). However, there was no evidence of such behavior.
The trading volumes rose after the commencement of market making by 118%. The increase 
was visible in all except one stock, indicating an improved liquidity. This was inline with the 
findings of Tevanen (2007), who reported an average increase of 396% in trading volumes. 
Since trading volumes do not separate between large block trades and market trades, we also 
wanted to see if market making had had any visible effect on the amount of zero-volume 
trading days, i.e. trading days where no trades are made. We found evidence supporting the 
increase in trading activity. After the commencement of market making, the amount of zero- 
volume trading days clearly dropped across all except one stock. The total number of zero- 
volume trading during total of 2562 days almost halved from 596 to 319, supporting the 
hypothesis of increased liquidity with market making.
The effect of market making on price volatility was somewhat weak. As the liquidity is an 
important factor of price volatility, we would have expected a decrease in the volatility
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through increased liquidity. However, the price volatility remained on average the same 
before and after market making, or in some cases even increased. Part of the volatility is due 
to the fact that as there was a large number of zero-volume trading days, increase in trading 
automatically creates more volatility as the price changes from day to day. The high volatility 
on the other hand could be explained by that still after the market making the stocks are rather 
illiquid and most of the trading is based on infonnation. As already brought up by Stoll (1979) 
and recently studied by Wu (2003), illiquid stocks generally have a higher percentage of 
informed trading than liquid stocks and are much more sensitive to it. Thus as there is no 
“noise” trading, the informed trading translates into much higher spreads for infrequently 
traded stocks, keeping the volatility rather high.
To conclude, the main function of Liquidity Providing, i.e. market making would seem to 
work as planned. The overall liquidity, measured by the bid-ask spread as well as turnover (or 
non-zero trading days), of the shares increased after the commencement of market making. 
However, what was interesting in the study was that investors did not value the increase in 
liquidity enough to lower their demanded risk premium. This would indicate that although 
market making provided increased liquidity in the form of lower bid-ask spread, lower spread 
volatility and increased turnover, the increase did not prove sufficient for investors and their 
demanding risk premium as the stock prices did not show any abnormal returns. It can be that 
the stocks were highly illiquid in the beginning and although their liquidity did increase, they 
were still seen as illiquid and risky. Maybe after some time, the increased liquidity would 
create more liquidity and eventually lower the risk premium. This however, will be for the 
future studies to find out.
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